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DEVELOPMENTS IN LIABILITY
THEORIES AND DEFENSES
ROBERT A. DESTRO*
Several months ago the General Counsel posed an interest-
ing and devilishly complex question, "Why don't courts take con-
stitutional claims and defenses seriously?"
Litigators with experience in the field of religious liberty be-
lieve that courts do not seem to take religious liberty claims and
defenses very seriously; however, it is difficult to know why. To
be sure, the anecdotal evidence is certainly there, not only in the
reported cases, but also in the actual courtroom experiences of
those who attempt to raise religious liberty claims and defenses.
In one Texas tort case, a trial court judge stated that she would
not permit the Church "to hide behind the first amendment;" in a
Maryland case a number of years ago, I was asked by a State
trial court judge what the federal constitution had to do with the
issues being litigated. These anecdotes affirm the existence of a
problem, but do not convey much information. Selected mem-
bers of the law faculty at the Catholic University of America
agreed to analyze the issue and to look carefully at each compo-
nent part.' The result is the following discussion.
.Associate Professor of Law, Catholic University of America; Director, Interdis-
ciplinary Program in Law & Religion. B.A., 1972, Miami University; J.D., 1975
University of California, Berkley.Providing even a partial answer to the question "Why don't courts take consti-
tutional claims and defenses seriously?" required a highly sophisticated exercise in
case analysis. Input of faculty who specialize in torts, evidence, insurance, profes-
sional responsibility, canon law, trial practice, appellate advocacy, and first amend-
ment law was required in order to construct the charts which illustrate the
substantive points made here. Their input was invaluable, not only because of its
substantive content, but also because it highlights both the multidisciplinary nature
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Courts do in fact take most First Amendment claims and de-
fenses seriously; however, litigators often do not provide the
courts with a record which will support the outcome their clients
desire. As might be expected given the case law, courts are
skeptical about broad-based immunity claims based upon the
first (or any other) constitutional amendment. Constitutional
claims are rejected in three basic instances: 1) when the law is
hostile; 2) when the lawyer defaults in the pleading, proof, or ar-
gument of the claim; or 3) when the lawyer does not understand
unsettled or developing law well enough to analyze, plead, or
prove the case.
The nature of constitutional litigation often requires litiga-
tors to seek some help from experts in the disciplines relevant to
the substantive law being litigated. Without such assistance, a
litigator may not know what points are worth litigating. "God
doesn't expect you to do this work alone and neither should we."2
The faculty at the Catholic University of America's two schools of
law, the Columbus School of Law and the Department of Canon
Law, stand ready to provide assistance.
Because there is a direct relationship between effective rep-
resentation and the state of the law governing the free exercise
of religion, the first part of this paper will explore the relation-
ship of constitutional theory to the litigation of constitutional
claims in tort cases. Lawyers cannot adequately plead or prove
constitutional claims and defenses without understanding how
the elements of a constitutional claim are related to the underly-
ing tort claim. Part two will focus on the elements of a viable
First Amendment claim or defense utilizing charts (appended) to
relate the elements of specific tort claims to the burden borne by
those seeking to establish affirmative constitutional claims or de-
of litigation practice and the need of litigators to solicit expert legal advice that law
faculties associated with religious institutions can provide. I would like to acknowl-
edge the input of the following Professors at the Columbus School of Law: Michael
Noone (Torts), Urban Lester (Trial Advocacy, Case Analysis, and Litigation Plan-
ning), Leah Wortham (Professional Responsibility and Insurance), Fred Bennett
(Effective Assistance of Counsel), Antonio Perez (Contracts), and Louis Barracato
(Evidence). I would also like to express my appreciation to our former Dean, Ralph
J. Rohner, whose moral and tangible support helped bring this project to comple-
tion, and to my research assistant, Laura Robinson, for her long hours and thorough
research.
2 Fr. Robert Kennedy, CUA Canon Law Department, Address at the National Di-
ocesan Attorneys Association Meeting (transcript available in Department of Canon
Law Library, Catholic University of America).
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fenses. Part three will analyze the First Amendment in a tort
context. Part four of this paper will conclude with a rather obvi-
ous, but vital, piece of advice: Attorneys should litigate every
point worth litigating.
I. RELATING CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY TO THE LITIGATION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL CASE
Just how seriously do the courts take religious liberty
claims? A careful review of federal case law indicates that the
courts have never been ardent champions of religious liberty. At
least since the Mormon polygamy cases, the United States Su-
preme Court has consistently taken the position that the relig-
ious motivation or purpose of an individual's behavior does not
immunize him from the regulatory power of the state.4 In The
Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints v. United States,5 Justice Bradley asserted the point
bluntly: "The State has a perfect right to prohibit ... all ... open
offenses against the enlightened sentiment of mankind, notwith-
standing the pretense of religious conviction by which they may
be advocated and practiced."
6
A series of cases beginning in 1963 with Sherbert v. Verner,7
and ending in 1990 with Employment Division v. Smith, led
most litigators and scholars to conclude that the concept of relig-
ious liberty is, or should be, roughly analogous to individual lib-
erty and autonomy rights recognized in other contexts. 9 That
' See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879) (holding that Mormons
are not immunized from bigamy statute).
4Id.
136 U.S. 1 (1890).
6 Id. at 50 (citations omitted).
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Employment Div. Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990). In response to Employment Div., Congress enacted The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 bb-1 (1996), which essentially mandates that
the courts use a strict scrutiny standard of review in religious liberty cases. Id. The
constitutional validity of the Act has been challenged on separation of powers
grounds, with the courts divided as to the outcome. Recently, the Supreme Court
has decided to hear issues. See Flores v. City of Boerne, Texas, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th
Cir. 1996) (holding that RFRA and strict scutiny standard do not violate separation
of powers), cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3282 (1996); see also In re Tessier, 190 B.R.
396 (Bankr. D.Mont. 1995) (holding that RFRA violates separation of powers).
' Professor Laurence Tribe, for example, subsumes religious freedom into the
general topic of rights of "privacy and autonomy." See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1988).
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approach, however, was at best highly selective. Most religious
liberty claims, except those arising in the unemployment com-
pensation context, were unsuccessful, notwithstanding the broad
language used by the Court to describe the nature of free exer-
cise rights.10
In Employment Division v. Smith, however, the Court held
that it was not a violation of the Free Exercise Clause to deny
unemployment compensation for job-related misconduct in cases
where the conduct involved was a violation of a criminal stat-
ute.1 In Smith, the individuals involved were counselors at a
drug-rehabilitation facility who had promised not to use drugs. 2
Notwithstanding that promise, they used peyote in a Native
American Church religious ritual and, as a result, were fired. 3
They claimed unemployment compensation, but were refused.
14
The Oregon Supreme Court held that while the Oregon Con-
stitution's guarantee of religious liberty did not protect them
from the reach of the State's drug laws, the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment required the State to provide unem-
ployment compensation.1' The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, but initially remanded the case for a decision
on the legality of drug use in religious ceremonies under the
Oregon state drug law. 16 Once the Oregon Supreme Court held
that religiously motivated drug use was illegal under the state's
drug laws, the United States Supreme Court again granted cer-
tiorari and rejected the argument that unemployment compen-
sation must be provided according to the Free Exercise Clause. 7
Counsel for Messrs. Smith and Black phrased the question
presented under the First Amendment as follows:
Does the Free Exercise Clause of the first amendment to the
United States Constitution protect a person's religiously moti-
vated use of peyote from the reach of a state's general criminal
10 Judge John Noonan of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
has provided a comprehensive list of free exercise cases and their outcomes in the
Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeal which is current to September 1988.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d
610, 625-29 (9th Cir. 1988) (Noonan, J. dissenting).
"Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 890.
12 Id. at 874.
13 id.
14 Id.
" Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P. 2d 445, 448-51 (Or. 1986).
Employment Div., 485 U.S. 660, 671-674 (1988).
17 Smith v. Employment Div., 763 P. 2d 146, 148 (1988) (per curiam).
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law prohibition? 1
The logic of their defense was that: 1) both Smith and Black
are members of the Native American Church; 2) the Native
American Church is a bona fide religious group; 3) peyote is a
"sacramental" substance utilized in the rituals of the Native
American Church; and 4) Smith and Black's use of peyote during
the course of Native American Church rituals was religiously
motivated, and was a central aspect of their faith experience.' 9
They thus concluded that the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment immunizes their conduct from the reach of the
state's generally applicable laws, even though peyote use was
prohibited by Oregon's criminal law and the use of such sub-
stances was considered, by the employer and the state, to be job-
related misconduct under the state's generally applicable unem-
ployment compensation laws.20
For a number of reasons (not least of which is clarity of
hindsight), this strategy was doomed to fail.21  Counsel for
Messrs. Smith and Black made a significant error by failing to
recognize that most parties raising free exercise claims lost
whenever the state was able to articulate an important state in-
terest which supported the regulation of the conduct at issue,
and, somehow, counsel erroneously concluded that by arguing
that the religious interest was important enough to the indi-
viduals involved, they could win their case. Justice Scalia's
opinion for the Court in Smith leaves no doubt that religious lib-
erty and individual autonomy are not the same:
[T]he "exercise of religion" often involves not only belief and pro-
fession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical
acts: assembling with others for a worship service, participating
in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining
from certain foods or certain modes of transportation. It would
be true, we think (though no case of ours has involved the
point), that a State would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Employment Div. v. Smith, (No. 88-1213) at i.
19 Id.
20 id.
21 Compare Michael McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Deci-
sion, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1120-24 (1990) (arguing Smith was inconsistent with
Court's prior free exercise jurisprudence) with Gerard V. Bradley, Beguilded: Free
Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245,
246-48 (1991) (disagreeing with McConnell and stating that Smith was consistent
with Court's prior jurisprudence).
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religion]" if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when
they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the
religious belief that they display. It would doubtless be uncon-
stitutional, for example, to ban the casting of "statues that are
to be used for worship purposes," or to prohibit bowing down be-
fore a golden calf.
Respondents in the present case, however, seek to carry the
meaning of "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" one large
step further. They contend that their religious motivation for
using peyote places them beyond the reach of a criminal law
that is not specifically directed at their religious practice, and
that is concededly constitutional as applied to those who use the
drug for other reasons. They assert, in other words, that
"prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" includes requiring
any individual to observe a generally applicable law that re-
quires (or forbids) the performance of an act that his religious
belief forbids (or requires). As a textual matter, we do not think
the words must be given that meaning ....
We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
conduct that the State is free to regulate. On the contrary, the
record of more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence
contradicts that proposition ....
The state, in other words, is free to regulate conduct as long
as it does not target religion for discriminatory treatment. 3 If
the field of law involved are those (e.g., torts, antitrust, property,
tax, etc.) that are entirely neutral in their general application,
religious exemptions are not constitutionally required.
2 4
Not surprisingly, this holding made Smith controversial. It
was, however, predictable. Almost ten years before Smith was
decided, Justice John Paul Stevens stated, "[I]t is the objector
who must shoulder the burden of demonstrating that there is a
unique reason for allowing him a special exemption from a valid
law of general applicability."25 Every litigator involved in a relig-
ious liberty claim or defense should remember this point.
But what does this mean in practice? Simply that notwith-
standing the enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration
22 Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 877-79.
" Id. at 881-82.
24 Id.
2" United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 262 (1982) (Stevens, J. concurring)
(emphasis added).
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Act 6 [RFRA, the constitutional, as opposed to statutory, law of
religious liberty requires counsel for the believer to shoulder the
burden of proving why an exemption from generally applicable
legal principles is required by the First Amendment.27
II. MAKING A CASE FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
Justice Stevens' position underscores the truism that a vi-
able "First Amendment ' 28 claim, like any other legal claim or de-
fense, rests on a clearly articulated set of facts. Regardless of
the nature of the constitutional claim,29 or the nature of the case
in which it will be utilized, ° the proponent bears the initial bur-
den of demonstrating: 1) the nature of the protected conduct
which is alleged to be affected by the government's actions, and
2) the nature and degree of the regulatory effect, or burden, on
the conduct alleged to be protected.
Because the focus of the inquiry is the manner in which gov-
ernment policies or actions inhibit the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights, the advocate must have a clear sense of the
opposing party's substantive legal theory before making an at-
tempt to formulate a responsive claim or defense based on the
Constitution. Is the case one which sounds in tort, contract,
agency, antitrust, or concepts of fiduciary duty? Does the consti-
tutional claim operate as an affirmative defense, or does it ne-
gate one of the elements of the cause of action? Without a
working knowledge of the elements of each cause in the opposi-
tion's case, the advocate will not be able to formulate a coherent
strategy for adducing the constitutional facts necessary to prove
26 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
27 Church of Lukumi Babalue Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523 (1992)
(reaffirming Smith).
28 The term "First Amendment claim or defense" is used here in a generic sense to
refer to any religious freedom claim, not simply those which are based on the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
29 This includes claims arising under the Speech and Press, Free Exercise, Peace-
able Assembly, and Petition Clauses. The only exception appears to be the Estab-
lishment Clause.
30 Examples might include, among others, a declaratory judgment action alleging
that a zoning rule "as applied" violates the First Amendment, a "free exercise" de-
fense to the recognition of a "pastoral malpractice" cause of action, or a statutory
claim under RFRA.
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that the Constitution controls the outcome.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN A TORT CONTEXT
A. Defining a "Tort"
A tort is either an intentional act which causes damage to a
legally protected interest, or the breach of a legal duty which is
the proximate cause of harm to a legitimate interest of another.3'
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a "duty" as a legal re-
quirement "that the actor is required to conduct himself in a
particular manner at the risk that if he does not do so he be-
comes subject to liability to another to whom the duty is owed
.... ,32 Although the focus of tort litigation is the action or omis-
sion by individuals alleged to be acting for the church, the court
is itself an "actor required [by the First Amendment] to conduct
[it]self in a particular manner."3 3 Thus, it is important that a
trial court hearing a case featuring a constitutional defense be
put on notice as early as possible that the First Amendment may
be relevant, not only to the defense of the church or religiously
motivated actor charged with tortuous conduct, but also to the
conduct of the litigation by the court and opposing counsel.
The task of the advocate is to lay a factual predicate for an
argument that either the conduct of the inquiry, including dis-
covery, or the nature of the duty or standard of care to be im-
posed on the church violates the First Amendment. Consider the
following illustrative case:
Peter Penitent had suffered for years from bouts of deep de-
pression, but had (over the objections of his wife) neglected to
seek "professional" help. His only counselor was his confessor,
Fr. Damien, who had warned Peter, in the strongest of terms,
that suicide is a grave sin, and that Peter had a moral obligation
to himself and to his family to seek professional help. Though
he could easily have done so, Fr. Damien made no attempt to
provide specific referrals, nor did he make any attempt to
"condition" absolution on Peter's willingness to seek treatment.
About six months ago, Peter sought treatment from a psychia-
trist and was informed that he had suffered "needlessly" for all
these years. He has now filed suit against Fr. Damien for clergy
"BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1489 (6th ed. 1990).
32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (1965).
33 id.
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malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
The relevant facts necessary to prove Father Damien's First
Amendment claim that Penitent's lawsuit and legal theory con-
stitute a grave threat to the Father's right to hear confessions
and offer spiritual advice to penitents are, for example: that dis-
covery will inevitably require testimony concerning matters cov-
ered by priest-penitent privilege; that reaching any decision
concerning at least the negative claims will necessarily involve
taking testimony on the standard of care for a reasonably pru-
dent confessor and will inevitably require a civil court to decide
questions of religious doctrine; that Father Damien's conduct in
the confessional cannot be considered unreasonable without
some examination of the practices of other priests in the com-
munity; that the duty undertaken by a confessor-and under-
stood by a penitent-is defined by specific provisions of Canon
Law and a clearly articulated theology of the Sacrament of Rec-
onciliation; and that if expert testimony on disputed issues of
care will be required, it is inevitable that disputes over their
qualifications will require the court to resolve disputed points of
theological doctrine and religious credibility.
B. The Nature of the Interests Involved in Tort Litigation
The assertion of First Amendment principles in tort litiga-
tion requires the litigator to have a clear understanding of tort
theory. When a First Amendment claim or defense is at issue,
there are at least three sets of interests involved: 1) the tort in-
terests of the plaintiff; 2) the First Amendment interests of the
defendant; and 3) the regulatory interests of the state.
Tort policies, like other forms of generally applicable gov-
ernment regulation, are constitutional if rationally related to an
otherwise legitimate state interest. The damage caused by in-
tentional or negligent torts is a social and economic problem
within the power of government to regulate. The regulatory in-
terests of the state, therefore, are entitled to a presumption of
constitutionality. The task of the litigator is to rebut that pre-
sumption.
A First Amendment claim or defense seeks to negate the
usual presumption of constitutionality, and to place the burden
of proving the nature and legitimacy of the regulatory interest
squarely on the state. In theory, such a defense concedes that a
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state's interest in the enforcement of its tort policies is a strong
one. Such a defense also asserts, however, that the Constitution
requires First Amendment liberties to be taken into account in
the formulation and enforcement of those policies.
Although torts is generally viewed as a field where religious
liberty is not, or should not be, an issue, there is strong support
in the case law for arguing that the First Amendment limits the
state's regulatory interests in tort cases. These cases, however,
are not directly on point.
Part of the reason why a well-developed theory does not ex-
ist for the application of religious liberty principles in the tort
context relates to the doctrine of charitable immunity.34 For
many years, charitable immunity was a complete defense to tort
claims against the church or its associated charitable activities.
Therefore, litigation against the church simply did not proceed
beyond the pleading stage. Charitable immunity thus guaran-
teed that neither the discovery and litigation of the cause, nor
the definition of the tort, could intrude upon religious freedom.
The press and media, on the other hand, had no such im-
munity, and have long argued that large damage awards and in-
trusive discovery orders can have a chilling effect on freedom of
speech and press. As a result, journalists and media advocacy
groups, such as the Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the
Press, have made a sustained and concerted effort to support the
chilling effect proposition whenever and wherever they believe
freedom of the press is threatened by tort claims. Indeed, they
do not permit their colleagues to litigate alone. They provide
support for reporters and small newspapers, support research,
sponsor conferences and research by academic fellows and stu-
34 See generally Daniel A. Barfield, Note, Better to Give Than to Receive: Should
Nonprofit Corporations and Charities Pay Punitive Damages?, 29 VAL. U. L. REV.
1193 (1995) (explaining recent trends extending charitable immunity doctrine and
reasons why charitable organizations should not be burdened with punitive dam-
ages); Kimberly A. Davison, Note, Cox v. The Evergreen Church: Liability Issues of
the Unincorporated Association, Is It Time for the Legislature to Step In?, 46
BAYLOR L. REV. 231 (1994) (explaining importance of charitable immunity as ap-
plied to unincorporated associations facing tort liability); Developments in the
Law-Nonprofit Corporations, VI. Special Treatment and Tort Law, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1579, 1677 (1992) (tracing recent developments in area of charitable immunity
in both case law and legislative action); Charles Robert Tremper, Compensation for
Harm From Charitable Activity, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 401 (1991) (criticizing moves
by states to reduce charitable immunity protections and proposing reforms through
adoption of new "Charitable Redress System").
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dent interns, award prizes for student writing competitions, and
participate in sophisticated strategies to sensitize both legisla-
tures and courts to the need for free and unfettered freedom of
speech and press. This effort may be seen in a long series of
cases which begins with New York Times v. Sullivan.35 Even
though it has taken years to integrate Speech and Press Clause
defenses into the fabric of tort law,36 constitutional claims and
defenses which seek to limit tort-style regulation of editorial
judgments are taken very seriously by courts and commenta-
tors .37
Advocacy for the Church must follow a similar pattern. De-
veloping the exact parameters of religious liberty in the tort con-
text will likely take years. As in the case of the press, legislation
will likely be needed to "fill in" when the courts refuse to provide
the necessary degree of protection. Nevertheless, the process
begins with counsel and client. If attorneys do not take constitu-
tional claims and defenses seriously and advise their clients ac-
cordingly, the courts cannot be expected to take them seriously
either.
C. What Kind of State Conduct "Violates" the First Amendment?
Tort litigation involves two forms of state action: 1) proce-
dural (the conduct of litigation generally, including discovery);
and 2) substantive (the definition and application of law, both
common and statutory). Much has been written on the relation-
ship of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment, and the preferred position of freedom of religion in
the constitutional hierarchy of rights. However, the advocate
who seeks to raise a Free Exercise or Establishment Clause de-
fense must understand clearly that the Supreme Court has con-
sistently given both clauses a narrow construction when used as
a shield against governmental power.
To say that a person's right to free exercise has been burdened,
of course, does not mean that he has an absolute right to engage
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
36 See generally David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in its Forgotten Years, 90
YALE L. J. 514 (1981) (discussing historical significance of lack of development of
First Amendment law from passage of the Sedition Act of 1798 until Espionage Act
of 1917).
" This does not mean that they are always accepted. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting
v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 872, 894 (1990) (addressing constitutionality of minority prefer-
ence rules in award of broadcast licenses).
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in the conduct. Under our established First Amendment juris-
prudence, we have recognized that the freedom to act, unlike
the freedom to believe, cannot be absolute.3s
The case law that has developed since Employment Division
v. Smith requires an attorney proposing either an affirmative
claim or defense resembling a free exercise claim to bear the
burden of establishing a prima facie case. The attorney must
show that recognition of the plaintiffs action, or the conduct of
the litigation and discovery involved, will result in any of the
following: 1) intentional discrimination against either religion in
general, or against specific religious groups; 2) acts which have
as their primary purpose [or effect] "advancing" or "inhibiting"
religion; 3) or acts which "excessively entangle" the state in relig-
ious matters.
Since tort litigation necessarily involves the elaboration of
legal duties, the First Amendment inquiry must focus on the na-
ture of the duty to be imposed as a matter of tort law and the de-
gree to which the imposition of that duty on churches, clergy, or
religious workers engaged in religious activities inhibits or bur-
dens the free exercise of religion.
The same points hold true with respect to the procedure
which governs all litigation: no religious liberty claim can be
made without a factual showing of the manner in which the par-
ticular request will violate the state's duty to avoid excessive en-
tanglement in religious matters or discrimination. After
Employment Division v. Smith, a mere assertion or demonstra-
tion that State action substantially burdens the free exercise of
religion is insufficient to state a claim under the Free Exercise
Clause. 9
1. Intentional Discrimination
Because intentional discrimination is the basis of all legal
distinctions, the Supreme Court has never held that discrimina-
tion alone renders a policy invalid. The court will examine the
reasons which support the distinction, and will uphold the policy
unless there is no rational relation between the policy and the
goal it seeks to accomplish.
Intentional discrimination on the basis of a suspect classifi-
38 Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 894.
'9 It may, however, be enough to sustain a claim under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994), or its state law counterparts.
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cation, such as race or citizenship status, however, is another
matter. Because the classification is presumed to be irrational, a
prima facie case involving a suspect classification will result in a
presumption that the law or policy is invalid. At that point, the
burden of proving the validity of the policy shifts to the state,
which must demonstrate that the policy is supported by a com-
pelling state interest, and that the policy is necessary to effectu-
ate that interest.
The United States Supreme Court has developed a number
of complex, and seemingly inconsistent, rules on the issue of re-
ligious discrimination. In Church of Likumi Babalue Aye v. City
of Hialeah,4 ° for example, the Supreme Court invalidated a local
ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice on the grounds that it was
aimed at eliminating the religious practices of the Santeria
cult.41 It has also invalidated tax exemptions expressly reserved
for religious publications,42 and the creation of a special school
district designed to eliminate the hostile public school environ-
ment facing a group of Satmarer Hasidic Jewish children.43 In
each of these cases, the central holding appears to be that relig-
ious discrimination is forbidden.
A closer examination of these cases indicates that the Court
is deeply divided over the relationship of non-discrimination
principles with respect to the issue of religious liberty.44 One
faction within the Court views religious discrimination as gen-
erally forbidden, but permits the legislature through the Free
Exercise Clause to make exceptions designed to accommodate
religious liberty. Another faction apparently holds that the Es-
tablishment Clause may require intentional discrimination on
the basis of religion or religious viewpoint, and that such dis-
crimination should be permitted where government is making a
40 508 U.S. 520 (1992).
' Id. at 523.
42 Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
4" Bd. of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 114 S.Ct. 2481
(1994).
" See Gerard Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Relig-
ious Liberty: A Machine that has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674, 743
(1987) (analyzing Constitutional debate over religious tests to demonstrate overall
lack of decisiveness regarding religious liberties); see also Robert A. Destro, "By
What Right?" The Sources and Limits of Federal Court and Congressional Jurisdic-
tion Over Matters "Touching Religion," 29 INDIANA L. REV. 1, 19-21 (1996)
(discussing deep divisions among Supreme Court justices as to the appropriate relig-
ious liberties review of Texas Monthly v. Bullock).
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good faith effort to avoid Establishment Clause controversies, 45
or where it is attempting to accommodate the interests of relig-
ious minorities.46
2. Acts Which "Excessively Entangle" the State in Religious
Affairs
There are three basic types of entanglement which have re-
ceived the attention of courts and commentators: 1) administra-
41 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 115 S.
Ct. 2510 (1995) (holding that University of Virginia cannot refuse funding for
Catholic student group publication by arguing that such funding would violate Es-
tablishment Clause); Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct.
2440 (1995) (holding that state cannot hide behind Establishment Clause in order to
prevent Klu Klux Klan from displaying cross in public along side similar displays
from other groups); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993)
(upholding requirement that state pay salary of sign language translator needed by
hearing impaired student enrolled in Catholic high school); Texas Monthly v. Bul-
lock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that state sales tax exemption for religious publica-
tions violate Establishment Clause).
41 See Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 919 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); id.
at 902-03 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor's
"endorsement" analysis focuses almost exclusively on the impact of perceived en-
dorsement of religion on the most discrete and insular members of the political
community, but stops short of creating what might be termed a "dissenter's veto" by
imposing an "objective observer" standard. However, the specific criteria the
"objective observer" is permitted to take into account remains unclear. Justice Ken-
nedy, for example, has noted that "[a]lthough Justice O'Connor disavows Justice
Blackmun's suggestion that the minority or majority status of a religion is relevant
to the question whether government recognition constitutes a forbidden endorse-
ment ... the very nature of the endorsement test, with its emphasis on the feelings
of the objective observer, easily lends itself to this type of inquiry." County of Alle-
gheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
677 (1989) (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omit-
ted). Justice O'Connor herself has indicated that questions of this sort require sen-
sitive judicial inquiries into "social fact." See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987)
(O'Connor, J. concurring in the judgment). The minority or majority status of the
religion would certainly be relevant to such an inquiry even if, in the end, it was not
determinative.
Alone among the Justices, Justice Stevens does not appear to be particularly
sympathetic to the claims of religious minorities. Not only has he consistently
questioned both the under and over inclusiveness of the Court's definition of the
term "minority," see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 552-553 (1980), he has
made it clear that government endorsement of religion, or lack of neutrality when
faced with "partisan ideology" (which, for him, includes religion), should be the
Court's primary concern. See Bd. of Educ. of the Westside Community Sch. v. Mer-
gens, 496 U.S. 226, 287-89 (1990) (Stevens, J. dissenting). On occasion, this may
mean no accommodation for religion at all. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503, 513 n.6 (1986) (Stevens, White, and Powell, JJ. concurring in the judgment).
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tive entanglement, such as oversight of church or church-school
use of state moneys, or of the content of the speech of state-
supported teachers placed in parochial schools; 2) doctrinal en-
tanglement, such as utilizing courts to decide matters of doc-
trine, for instance 'Which church factions claiming the property
are the true believers?'; and 3) political entanglement, such as
excessive church involvement in political affairs.
The task of counsel for the church, clergy, or pastoral worker
is to argue that the First Amendment protects the discretion of
each to practice the tenets and rituals of their faith without fear
that the State will seek to intervene whenever individuals allege
that religiously motivated conduct has caused harm. Thus, only
the first two types of entanglement are relevant here.47
To the extent that a civil court's process involves extensive
examination and discovery of the administrative and structural
aspects of church operations, the discovery process may itself ar-
guably constitute administrative entanglement. Courts, how-
ever, have not been particularly sympathetic to such claims.
Rather, evidence that the litigants intend to utilize civil discov-
ery rules, which are rules of general applicability, in a manner
which unconstitutionally intrudes upon the exercise of religious
beliefs is required.48
Counsel must, therefore, be prepared to demonstrate how
compliance with discovery requests will impose an unconstitu-
tional burden on religious belief or action. A good example is
provided by the "Illustrative Case of Peter Penitent" set out
above. Generally, it may be impossible to determine what a rea-
sonably prudent confessor does, or should be doing, without ex-
tensive discovery concerning: 1) the training of priests and
seminarians; 2) the theology of the Sacrament; 3) what confes-
sors actually do in the confessional; and 4) how other confessors
handle similar cases. Extensive consideration of any one of these
topics would bring the relevance of the First Amendment into
sharp focus.
Preservation of the integrity of the sacramental relationship
'7 The last item, political entanglement, is largely a dead letter, having been a
"make-weight" argument in a number of school finance and abortion-related cases.
See Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (holding that
state funds for private colleges and universities may be awarded to religious insti-
tutions for secular functions).
48 See National Conference of Catholic Bishops v. Bell, 490 F. Supp. 734 (D.D.C.
1980).
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established in a priest-penitent communication is the critical
component of the free exercise clause of both confessor and peni-
tent. The effective litigator will thus need to know whether the
jurisdiction recognizes a priest-penitent privilege, who holds it,
and whether or not the protection it offers is subject to any ex-
ceptions.
In all cases where litigants seek to breach the secrecy of the
confessional, the initial inquiry would focus on the nature and
identity of the interests at stake as understood by the Church
and the parties. Reference to the Code of Canon Law and to
relevant Church documents would be critical to establishing both
the sacramental nature of the relationship and the religious ob-
ligations that bind confessor's actions prior to, during, and after
the sacrament is administered. Once that foundation has been
set, attention shifts to the specifics of the civil law which governs
the relationship.
If the privilege conferred by common law or statute is held
by both confessor and penitent, there are legal grounds for argu-
ing that nothing in this line of inquiry could lead to the discovery
of relevant evidence, regardless of the identity of the party
seeking to intrude upon the secrets of the confessional. Where
either party to the sacramental relationship can assert the
privilege, the constitutional claims need not be reached at all.
If, by contrast, the privilege can be waived by the penitent
and the confessor can be called to testify, the litigator must be
prepared to make a case under the First Amendment, its state
constitutional analogue, or both. To the extent that the purpose
of the priest-penitent privilege under common and statutory law
is to protect the religious freedom of the penitent, evidence con-
cerning the canonical relationship between confessor and peni-
tent would support a claim that the religious freedom of
confessors is implicated as well. A deposition question to Father
Damien seeking his recollection of conversations during which
Peter Penitent sought the Sacrament of Reconciliation would
undoubtedly burden Father Damien's free exercise rights, and
Canon law makes it clear that his religious obligation in such a
setting is not contingent on any act of the penitent. Differential
treatment of penitent and confessor in such a setting raises
questions of intentional discrimination among believers, and
raises many of the same questions considered and resolved in
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Church of Lukumi Babalue, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.49
A subpoena seeking to establish the standard of care among
confessors in the community, or an interrogatory which requires
the Church to identify experts who can testify on the nature,
content, and fine points of church doctrine, however, would raise
a very different set of issues: the power of courts to decide dis-
puted issues of religious ritual or doctrine. Since civil courts
may not decide such controversies," discovery would be inappro-
priate because none of the facts to be discovered would be rele-
vant to the decision or proof of a justiciable claim.
3. Acts Which Have as Their Primary Purpose [or Effect]
"Advancing" or "Inhibiting" Religion
The advance or inhibit formula is the second element of the
three-pronged test for compliance with the Establishment Clause
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.5 1  It
has been used repeatedly by the Court to invalidate laws which
are said to advance religion when they provide tangible support
for children attending church-related schools. It has rarely, if
ever, been utilized by individuals or institutions seeking to in-
validate a law on the grounds that such law's primary effect is to
inhibit the practice of their religion.
As a result, cases involving inhibition of religion are liti-
gated under the far less stringent rules governing the Free Ex-
ercise Clause. Nevertheless, Lemon v. Kurtzman's second prong
does contain some important elements for litigators to remem-
ber. For example, a judicial holding that Expert A's views on the
duties of a priest to a penitent are more credible than Expert B's
may not inhibit anyone's religious freedom, but it would directly
involve a judicial holding which advances Expert A's theological
or doctrinal views at the expense of Expert B's. Since the es-
sence of an Establishment Clause claim is proof that the gov-
ernment has established an official position on a matter of faith
or doctrine, the entire inquiry (or "battle of experts") is problem-
49 508 U.S. 520 (1992).
'o See infra note 54.
51 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The "Lemon test" is stated as follows: "First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its'principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . finally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Id. at 612-13 (citations
omitted).
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atic under the First Amendment ab initio. It may also be prob-
lematic as "junk theology" under Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
IV. THE NATURE OF THE LITIGATOR'S TASK
A. Articulating the Distinction Between the Church's Religious
and Secular Activities
Lawyers generally perceive constitutional law as relatively
theoretical and different in many ways from "real law." Perhaps
because of the way constitutional law is taught in law schools,
the tendency of many is to focus on policy; that is, what it is or
should be, rather than upon the application of the developed
principles to actual cases.
A policy-oriented attitude among lawyers who devote a con-
siderable amount of time to representing churches and church-
related institutions is dangerous. To focus on broad generaliza-
tions concerning what the law is-or worse, what the client or
lawyer would like to it be-is to risk missing the important de-
tails which go into getting law made correctly in the first place.
The litigator works with existing law and must determine from
the beginning whether the case being proposed or litigated in-
volves a routine application of existing principles, or the need to
stretch such principles to accommodate his or her client's posi-
tion.
The Church exists in the modern world, but it is not of the
world. Although, for that very reason, direct regulation of the
Church is problematic, the courts are not sympathetic to
broadly-based immunity claims. Lawyers who represent the
Church must relate to the court that the cumulative effect of
both direct and indirect government regulation has made the
Church into a regulated industry.
Education and health care are big business and are heavily
regulated. That the church is a major provider of both makes a
difference only at the margins. Social work and counseling are
now regulated professional activities. Clergy malpractice claims
are simply a reflection of that trend. Indeed, increasingly per-
vasive health, safety, zoning, tax, and civil rights laws can make
even a proposed Boy Scout pancake breakfast in the church hall
52 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 507 U.S. 904 (1993).
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an occasion for a confrontation with what Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy has called "the modern administrative state."53
The tendency of government regulators and opposing coun-
sel in such a setting is to try to distinguish those activities that
are at the core of the Church's religious activities from those that
are secular. But this is often a difficult task which the courts are
reluctant to undertake. As a result, there is a growing tendency
among judges and in the plaintiffs' bar to view the Church as a
group of people engaged in secular activities for religious rea-
sons. While this is an important development, it only exacer-
bates the problem. Tort law is a potent regulatory device which
can be brought to bear on the activities of the Church and its
subsidiary organizations. Once an activity has been defined as
secular, but religiously-motivated, it is, like most other endeav-
ors, subject to both direct and indirect regulation in the public
interest.
B. Converting the Sacred into the Secular: "Neutral Principles of
Law" and Avoidance Pleading
1. The Need to Make the Connection Between Fact and Theory
In states where charitable immunity has been abolished by
statute or judicial decree, the preliminary question for a court
deciding a tort claim against a church is whether the concept of
religious liberty will, or should, serve as a source of immunity.
Such a question cannot be decided in the abstract. To formulate
a rule of decision, the court needs both a careful analysis of ap-
plicable federal and state constitutional principles, and a factual
record which clearly demonstrates why those principles are rele-
vant.
At the federal level, the case law demonstrates that since
the late nineteenth century, broad-based regulatory immunity
for religiously motivated conduct does not exist. Even under the
state case law which rejects the narrow vision of religious liberty
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Employment
Division v. Smith, immunity for religiously motivated conduct
does not exist when the state's interest can be characterized as
compelling.
13 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657 (1989) (Kennedy, White, & Scalia, JJ., con-
curring and dissenting).
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In practical terms, the relationship of tort law to religious
liberty presents two basic questions: 1) Why should clergy, the
religious, or others who minister to the public in the name of re-
ligion be immune from tort liability when others can be sued for
the same, or similar, conduct when it occurs in a non-religious
setting? and 2) Is there some way to accommodate legitimate re-
ligious liberty claims within the general framework of tort law?
To answer these questions, the concept known as "Neutral
Principles of Law"5 4 has emerged. Developed in the context of
disputes over the ownership of church property, where each of
the warring factions claims the mantle of the true church, the
neutral principles approach is a device civil courts use to avoid
resolution of doctrinal disputes. In such property cases, it is of-
ten possible to rely on neutral legal documents, such as deeds
and articles of incorporation, to determine the ownership, dispo-
sition, or control issues which divide a congregation. A tort case
which rests on a claim that there has been ministerial or priestly
misconduct during the course of religious ministry is an intra-
church dispute as well, but the legal and constitutional aspects
of the controversy are not so easily avoided as in property cases.
Attempts by the state to set standards of ministerial and relig-
ious conduct raise religious liberty concerns which are just as
problematic as attempts by a court to declare which faction in a
property dispute is most faithful to church doctrine.
Since it is impossible to avoid all doctrinal disputes by the
simple expedient of referring to a neutral document or principle,
a debate has arisen in constitutional circles over the nature of
the neutral principles doctrine itself. Is it simply one of a num-
ber of alternative approaches to deciding cases involving intra-
church disputes permitted by the Free Exercise Clause, or a rule
of law which is mandated by the Establishment Clause?
The distinction is an important one. The view that neutral
principles is an approach which helps courts avoid decisions on
issues of faith or doctrine is fully consistent with the strictest
reading of the Supreme Court's religious liberty jurisprudence.
In this view, neutral principles of law are utilized to examine the
facts of the case at bar to determine which issues are "secular"
The phrase gained currency in the Supreme Court's treatment of property dis-
putes in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604-06 (1979). For an extensive discussion of
the concept, see MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A
PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 507-517 (1996).
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and which appear to be "religious." By segregating the issues,
courts can limit their jurisdiction to civil matters and pressure
churches to organize their affairs in a manner which leads to in-
ternal resolution of doctrinal disputes.
A more problematic reading of the neutral principles doc-
trine is that civil courts can, and should, resolve intra-church
disputes by assuming that the issues in dispute are no different
than those issues concerning any other intra-organizational dis-
pute. In this view, neutral principles are utilized to resolve the
controversy itself, rather than to determine the limits of the
court's jurisdiction over the issues.
Moses v. Diocese of Colorado55 is one of the leading cases on
the application of the First Amendment in a tort context, and
one of the best examples of how not to apply the neutral princi-
ples doctrine. In Moses, the Colorado Supreme Court stated that
a court "should analyze legal issues that arise out of church or-
ganizations in the same manner as [it] would analyze those is-
sues if they arose out of any other corporation or voluntary
association," and makes the rather unexceptionable statement
that "[a]pplication of a secular standard to secular conduct that
is tortuous is not prohibited by the Constitution."
56
If the Colorado Supreme Court's holding were simply that
neutral principles mean that courts should engage in a searching
inquiry designed to differentiate between "religious" and
"secular" conduct, and then should apply secular standards only
to secular conduct, Moses would have presented a good opportu-
nity to explore what principles should be utilized to draw that
critical distinction.
Unfortunately, that is not the holding of Moses. The Colo-
rado Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior holding that clergy
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty by a minister are not
merely different names for the same tort57 by stating that
"counseling" is secular conduct, even if it does have significant
religious components. 5
This application of the neutral principles doctrine is prob-
lematic for several reasons. Although there are numerous cases
which seek to define the terms "religion" or "religious," courts
55 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2153 (1994).
5' Moses, 863 P.2d at 320.
5' Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988).
"' See Moses, 863 P.2d at 321.
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and commentators agree that judges have no business deciding
religious questions." As a result, virtually all the reported cases
decide the question by asking whether or not the conduct or or-
ganization in question looks religious.0 More to the point, there
is virtually no case law or commentary which explains the
meaning of the term secular. In practice, secular means not re-
ligious.
Thus, while it is true that "[a]pplication of a secular stan-
dard to secular conduct that is tortuous is not prohibited by the
Constitution,"61 the only neutral principles which can tell a court
how to separate the religious and secular components of inher-
ently religious conduct or relationships, such as the priest-
penitent relationship, are: 1) the intent of the parties; 2) the
character and setting of their relationship; and 3) the content of
the evidence necessary to establish the claims and defenses in
the case.
Defense counsel should not permit opposing counsel, or the
court, to characterize religious conduct as secular without mak-
ing a record which demonstrates beyond cavil that the charac-
terization is wrong. Pastoral counseling and the Sacrament of
Confession do not become mere counseling by judicial fiat, nor
does the canonical relationship between priest and bishop be-
come a simple agency relationship because there is some degree
of supervision. If the act of ordination is hiring and the laying-
on of hands or baptism is merely a touching, the neutral princi-
ples doctrine has ceased to function as a mechanism to protect
First Amendment rights.62 It has instead become a mechanism
for permitting the state to supervise the internal operations of
'9 See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (1871) ("Whenever the questions of dis-
cipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the
highest of [the] church judiciaries to which the matter has been carried, the legal
tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and binding.").
'0 A related problem arises in courts defining-or trying to define-what is a
"church." See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (6th ed.
1992), quoting, Found. of Human Understanding v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1341, 1356-57
(1987) ("We can only approach this question with care for all of us are burdened
with the baggage of our own unique beliefs and perspectives.").
6' Moses, 863 P.2d at 320.
62 Controversies charging 'wrongful baptism" are not unknown. See Suit Filed
Over Girl's Baptism, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 4, 1995, at 19A (reporting how a
six year old girl was lured to baptism by believing she was attending carnival). Vir-
ginia prison authorities recently denied a condemned prisoner the right to be re-
baptized on the grounds that "once is enough." See David Cox, Baptism: Salvation is
Not a Matter of State, ROANAKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Feb. 15, 1995, at All.
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the church.
Cases following Moses have put immense pressure on the
advocate to be precise in pleading and motion practice because
neither tort nor First Amendment claims can be litigated in the
abstract. Plaintiffs' attorneys engage in precision pleading when
they plead alternative theories based on a common set of facts.
Defense counsel must be prepared to do the same.
The charts which follow as an addendum look at a number of
tort theories which have been asserted against churches. As
these charts illustrate, finding the dividing line between the sa-
cred and the secular can be a complicated task, but the litigator
who seeks to establish a First Amendment claim or defense as-
sumes the burden of proving every element of that claim. Moses
teaches that judges no longer assume that the church is entitled
to special treatment. In fact, it goes further, and mandates that
courts should assume precisely the opposite: that when there are
secular consequences, the church is engaged in secular conduct.
The job of defense counsel is to rebut that presumption.
2. The Nature and Importance of Constitutional Facts
Constitutional claims are not so different from claims based
on other legal theories. Like tort, property, agency and other le-
gal or equitable claims, a constitutional claim or defense has
both factual and theoretical components. The theory tells us
what the law is trying to accomplish and determines what facts
are relevant. Theory cannot, however, determine what facts are
controlling in constitutional litigation.
A constitutional fact is a predicate, foundation, or element
which must be established before a constitutional principle ap-
plies.6' Like any other adjudicative fact 64 in dispute, a constitu-
tional fact must be litigated, but the close relationship between
63 Professor David Faigman has defined "constitutional fact-finding" as the study
of "those facts identified as being relevant either to the establishment of a constitu-
tional rule or reviewable under an established constitutional rule." David L. Faig-
man, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding:" Exploring the Empirical Component
of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 546 n.18 (1991).
64 There are three basic types of "facts" relevant to legal decision-making: 1)
"legislative facts", which inform the making or changing of rules (e.g., the social cost
of changing a given rule of law); 2)"adjudicative facts", which relate to a disputed
point between parties in a case before the court (e.g., the amount of damages in a
breach of contract); and 3) "social-framework facts", which form the background or
framework in which a given case is set.
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constitutional theory and fact often makes it difficult to deter-
mine whether a particular question will be viewed by the court
as a question of law or a question of fact.
In Bose Corp. v. Consumers' Union,65 the United States Su-
preme Court indicated that:
A finding of fact in some cases is inseparable from the principles
through which it was deduced. At some point, the reasoning by
which a fact is "found" crosses the line between application of
those ordinary principles of logic and common experience which
are ordinarily entrusted to the finder of fact into the realm of a
legal rule upon which the reviewing court must exercise its own
independent judgment. Where the line is drawn varies accord-
ing to the nature of the substantive law at issue. Regarding cer-
tain largely factual questions in some areas of the law, the
stakes-in terms of impact on future cases and future conduct-
are too great to entrust them finally to the judgment of the trier
of fact.
6
The significance of this observation in First Amendment liti-
gation can only be deduced through a careful reading of the
Court's First Amendment cases-including those arising under
the Speech and Press, Peaceable Assembly, and Petition Clauses.
In Free Exercise cases, for example, a factual showing that there
is some degree of entanglement between church and state is
treated as a question of adjudicative fact. In Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause is
not violated unless the government intended to impose a burden
on the exercise of religion. 6' The constitutional facts to be ad-
duced are whether the entanglement actually burdens the exer-
cise of religion, and whether the government intended such
entanglement to do so. A showing that it was merely incidental
68to an otherwise neutral policy will not be sufficient. The case
law under the Speech and Press Clause has similar characteris-
tics.
69
In Establishment Clause cases, by contrast, a finding that a
government policy will lead to an excessive entanglement be-
tween church and state is not a finding of constitutional fact, it
466 U.S. 485 (1984).
Id. at 501 n. 17.
:7 Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 872.
68 Id. at 878.
6 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575 (1983).
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is a conclusion of law. In some cases, an entanglement between
church and state can be legally excessive without causing a bur-
den on the religious freedom of the parties because the actual in-
teraction between church and state is of a routine nature; in
others, the same conduct is forbidden. ° This is so because the
three-pronged test of Lemon v. Kurtzman operates primarily as a
rule of law, rather than as a blueprint for fact-finding.
C. Good Lawyering and the Demise of the "Clergy Malpractice"
Theory
A good litigator will not plead, or attempt to prove, a case
which goes either to the heart of constitutionally protected inter-
ests or challenges long-standing case law unless the litigator
feels that the case law will allow a frontal attack. The best ex-
ample in the free exercise context is the attempt by the plaintiffs'
bar to urge recognition of the tort of clergy malpractice.
The theory behind clergy malpractice is that a member of
the clergy undertakes certain duties when serving in a sacerdo-
tal or counseling position. Rejected on First Amendment
grounds by all courts considering it, 7 it seems fairly clear that
the reason the courts have been so hostile to recognizing clergy
malpractice is because of the obvious impact on First Amend-
ment rights.
This teaches us two important lessons. First, courts take
clearly-articulated First Amendment claims based on the Relig-
ion Clause just as seriously as they do clearly-articulated First
Amendment claims based on the Speech and Press Clause. Sec-
ond, and by far the most important, religious liberty was, and is,
perceived to be such a weak claim or defense that the plaintiffs'
bar had no trouble pleading a tort theory which is so clearly at
odds with religious liberty. That the plaintiffs' bar felt that a
frontal attack could succeed should have been a signal to defense
counsel who represent clients with religious liberty interests.
Plaintiffs plead multiple and duplicative claims in order to
'0 Compare, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of California,
493 U.S. 378 (1990) (stating that reporting, auditing, and collecting of sales tax re-
ceipts does not foster "excessive entanglement") with Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971) (auditing school teacher performance and school aid funds fosters
"excessive entanglement").
7' No court has ever endorsed "clergy malpractice." See Mark Chopko, Ascending
Liability of Religious Entities for the Actions of Others, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADV. 189,
335-36 & nn.212-219 (1993) (collecting cases).
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restate the same cause of action in a number of different ways; to
assure that all bases under state law are covered; to guarantee
that the jury hears the facts thought to be damaging over and
over again; and to reach the deep pocket. Given the rejection of
clergy malpractice theory, a plaintiffs lawyer who does not at-
tempt to avoid those holdings through creative pleading is
wasting the client's money.
Defense counsel who plead undifferentiated First Amend-
ment defenses because they do not understand the relationship
between First Amendment and tort theory are also wasting their
clients' money. The case law makes it clear that First Amend-
ment theory is relatively undeveloped in the tort context, and the
tendency of courts hearing tort cases is to provide a remedy
when the law appears to support recovery. Since most -clergy
malpractice claims do involve outrageous conduct on the part of
the clergy and other religious workers, it should not have been
surprising, either as a matter of litigation theory, tort practice,
or constitutional law, that plaintiffs would seek to avoid the con-
stitutional issues by pleading in the alternative. The question
for defense counsel is why they are permitted to get away with
it.
D. Hard Cases Make Bad Law. Bad Lawyering Makes it Even
Worse
Moses is a good example of the way in which undeveloped
constitutional theory, a bad set of facts, and a lack of effective
representation on the part of diocesan counsel combine to pro-
duce bad law.
The plaintiff in Moses was an adult woman who had devel-
oped multiple personalities as a result of sexual abuse as a
child. 2 She sought spiritual counseling from her priest, who
knew that her history of mental problems was related to child-
hood sexual abuse.73 Sessions included discussions, prayer, and
"hugs" which eventually led to sex. 4 When her family learned of
the sexual activity, they complained to the head pastor, who
failed to take action. ' The family then went to the Bishop. 6
71 Moses, 863 P.2d at 315.
71 Id. at 316.
74 id.
71 Id. at 316-17.
71 Moses, 863 P.2d at 317.
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The Bishop met with the offending priest, sought to ascer-
tain the facts, warned him not to involve himself in an affair
with a parishioner again, and suggested that he should seek pro-
fessional counseling." Although he approved a transfer of the of-
fending priest to a parish in Colorado Springs without informing
the new parish of what had occurred, he did warn the priest to
refrain from similar misconduct. The priest was also told to in-
form the Bishop immediately if there were any possibility of the
priest becoming involved in an affair with a member of his new
parish. 9
The Bishop also took steps to counsel the plaintiff in the
case. 0 The record indicated that the plaintiff "was terrified
about the loss of her salvation and feared having to meet with
the Bishop."81 When they met, she "described her past ... and
explained that she had an intimate sexual relationship with Fa-
ther Robinson. [She] discussed her fear of not having salvation
because of her acts and Bishop Frey granted [her] absolution. 82
The theory of the plaintiffs case against the Bishop and the
Episcopal Diocese was that the Bishop's conduct was a breach of
fiduciary duty; that he had negligently hired and supervised the
priest and pastor; and that the Diocese was vicariously liable for• 83
the acts of its priests. Since there is no question that the
priest's behavior was inappropriate, and little doubt that the
plaintiff was damaged by the affair, it was not surprising that
the offending priest declared bankruptcy and was removed from
the case.84 For the Episcopal Diocese, however, the questions
presented were different. A Bishop who counsels with a member
of his flock and grants her absolution is not just another coun-
selor with a deeper pocket. The issue presented is one of legal
versus religious duty and of the right of a civil court to determine
which shall prevail. Significantly, it was on this very point that
the defense counsel failed to represent the Episcopal Diocese of
Colorado effectively.
The controlling Colorado precedent at the time Moses was
77 id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Moses, 863 P.2d at 317-18.
"Id. a' 318.
82 Id.
83 Id.
14 Moses, 863 P.2d at 318.
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litigated was Destefano v. Grabrian.s8 In Destefano, the Colorado
Supreme Court rejected clergy malpractice as a viable theory of
recovery for tortuous conduct which occurs in a pastoral setting,
but its analysis made two significant points which should have
been critical to the defensive strategy in Moses: 1) "that a cause
of action for breach of fiduciary duty [is] separate and distinct
from a claim of clergy malpractice,"86 and 2) that the First
Amendment does not confer blanket immunity upon the clergy
from claims that a member of the clergy has breached a legal
duty to a member of the congregation.1
7
Notwithstanding the clear holdings of Destefano that a dio-
cese can be held liable under theories of breach of fiduciary duty,
negligent supervision, and vicarious liability, the Colorado Su-
preme Court noted that "[t]he defendants' only argument at trial
regarding the First Amendment was ... that any evidence of
church law or discipline should not be admitted. [They] did not
argue ... that the First Amendment forbids claims of breach of fi-
duciary duty, negligent hiring and supervision and vicarious li-
ability against a religious organization."8  On appeal, the
defendant's argument was that Destefano should be overruled
because "claims of breach of fiduciary duty and clergy malprac-
tice are merely different names for professional liability."89
There were several problems that contributed to the devel-
opment of the extraordinarily bad precedent that Moses has be-
come. The most obvious is the failure to preserve all relevant
constitutional claims at the trial level, for the case law is clear
that, unless claims are preserved, they will be deemed waived on
appeal. 90 More serious were the rote readings of the governing
'5 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988).
86 Moses, 863 P.2d at 321 n. 13.
17 Destefano, 763 P.2d at 283-84.
88 Moses, 863 P.2d at 319 n. 10 (emphasis added).
9 Id. at 321.The court noted that the "First Amendment issues raised on appeal were not
properly preserved in the trial court," but that "it is within our discretion to review
the First Amendment defenses." Id. at 319. The court then reminded counsel that:
We have consistently held, with few exceptions, issues not raised in the
trial court cannot form the basis of an appeal. See, e.g., Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Adams, 718 P.2d 508, 513 (Colo. 1986)
(recognizing that appellate challenges to issues that do not call into ques-
tion trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and that are not raised in trial
court are waived and will not be reviewed for first time on appeal). The fact
that the non-preserved issue involves questions of constitutional analysis,
interpretation, or application is not dispositive of whether we will address
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case law. This led counsel to condemn the introduction of evi-
dence regarding church law and discipline without first consider-
ing whether it might play a useful role in the litigation. Each of
these lapses in good trial practice led to the lack of an adequate
trial record supporting the First Amendment claims and de-
fenses that were relevant to the case.
The burden of proving that the First Amendment was rele-
vant not only to the defense of the alleged torts, but also to the
conduct of discovery, the admission of evidence, and the conduct
of the trial was on the defense. The facts in Moses demonstrated
that the conduct which formed the basis of the complaint against
the Bishop and the Diocese involved at least three relationships
which the state has little competence to regulate: 1) the content
and conduct of priest-penitent conversations; 2) the canonical
relationship between and among Bishops and the priests of the
Episcopal Church; and 3) canonical or other doctrinal criteria for
ordination and retention in that denomination. It seems, how-
ever, that counsel did not make the connection between the tort
and constitutional claims. Their argument that "claims of
breach of fiduciary duty and clergy malpractice are merely dif-
ferent names for professional liability,"91 while correct, both
begged the question and conceded that a Bishop was, in fact, just
another "professional."
Destefano held that while the elements of these causes of
action are similar, the torts address different regulatory inter-
ests.9' It would not have been inconsistent with Destefano to
conduct the trial in Moses in a manner which sought to explore
the precise nature of those regulatory interests, and how they in-
truded on the self-governing nature of the Episcopal Church.
Had defense counsel done so, the effect would have been to argue
what might be considered the broad claim "that the First
Amendment forbids claims of breach of fiduciary duty, negligent
hiring and supervision, and vicarious liability against a religious
organization." Where the record supports such an argument,
there is no legal or ethical problem for arguing for a change in
the law.
the issue on appeal. See, e.g., Massey v. People, 656 P.2d 658, 662 (Colo.
1982) (declining to address a constitutional argument on appeal that was
not presented for determination by the trial court).
Id. at 319 n. 10.
9 Moses, 863 P.2d at 321.
Destefano, 763 P.2d at 284-86.
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Had counsel not wished to go so far, the same kind of show-
ing could have been made on the facts of the case in Moses itself.
Had counsel argued the much narrower assertion that the First
Amendment forbids the entry of judgment against either the
Bishop or the Diocese on the unique facts of Moses because it in-
volved priest-penitent and other intra-church matters, a factual
predicate might have been established for the First Amendment
claim. But neither argument was made. The Colorado Supreme
Court rejected the First Amendment defense in Moses not be-
cause it is hostile to religious liberty claims, but because those
claims were neither proved nor argued.
Moses is undoubtedly a hard case on both the facts and the
law, and it is easy for a law professor sitting a thousand miles
and several years distant from the actual trial to second-guess
counsel's actions. But it was the Colorado Supreme Court, not a
law professor, who pointed out that counsel did not make the
necessary arguments at the trial court level.93 Moses does make
bad law, and counsel is partially responsible for it.
Counsel is not, however, primarily responsible for the bad
law which is actually made in a case. The Colorado Supreme
Court must also take some responsibility for that development.
The Colorado Supreme Court obviously takes religious liberty
claims and defenses seriously, for had Moses involved a claimant
other than the church, it is doubtful that the Colorado Supreme
Court would have entertained any arguments not preserved be-
low. But because it did take religious freedom, in the abstract,
seriously, the court allowed counsel for the defense to make a
bad argument, unsupported by anything in the record below.
This was a mistake. Constitutional arguments unsupported
by a factual record are worse than useless; they are dangerous.
Courts should not rule on them. Had the Colorado Supreme
Court simply applied the neutral principle that constitutional
rights not briefed or argued below are waived on appeal, Moses
would have made no law at all. From a doctrinal standpoint,
that would have been the best result.
CONCLUSION
Constitutional litigation is a complex undertaking. Litiga-
tors cannot possibly hope to convince the courts that religious
9' Moses, 863 P.2d at 318-19.
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liberty principles should limit the state's ability to impose tort
liability for religious activities gone awry without careful atten-
tion to theoretical and factual detail.
Unfortunately, the typical litigation firm has neither the
time nor the resources to undertake such representation alone.
Nor should it. Counsel who represent the media would never
consider such a course of action; neither should counsel for the
Church. Experts are available to advise on theory, case analysis,
briefs and arguments, discovery, and appellate strategy. They
can also be pressed into service to write amicus briefs and argue
complex issues on appeal.
The Catholic University of America is, or should be, the
place where counsel for the Church can come to test their theo-
ries, and to get some sophisticated research done. The University
would not have an Interdisciplinary Program in Law and Relig-
ion if it did not believe it had something to offer. "God does not
expect you to do it alone, and neither should we."94
' Fr. Robert Kennedy, supra note 2.
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